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Climate change has been called the defining “human development 
challenge[] of the [twenty-first] [c]entury.”1  On the one hand, there is 
increasing scientific certainty that anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) and destruction of sinks has sped up or 
forced climate change2 at such a rate that our technology, our 
institutional capacity, and our political will may not be sufficient to 
respond to the challenges it will raise.3  On the other hand, the process 
will take place over the course of several decades, and there is still 
considerable uncertainty about what the exact impacts of climate 
change will be and how quickly they will occur, particularly at the 
local level.4  Policymakers at every level of government are currently 
grappling with the prospect of massive changes to our way of life that 
will be required both to mitigate climate change through reduction of 
emissions and increase of sinks, and to adapt to climate change 
through changes to human systems.  Such changes must ensure that 
we are better prepared to respond to the impacts of climate change 
that have, at this point, become either largely inevitable or are already 
being experienced. 
At the annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in 
Copenhagen in December 2009,5 member states addressed the fate of 
two of the UNFCCC’s key projects.  The first project was agreement 
upon a successor to the largely unsuccessful and soon to expire Kyoto 
Protocol,6 which has been the basis of the primary climate change 
mitigation regime at the international level.  The second was the 
negotiation of funding for adaptation to the impacts of climate change 
in the developing world, which has the potential to dramatically 
 
1 U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting 
Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World 31 (2007), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf. 
2 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], Summary 
for Policy Makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 1–18 
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007). 
3 See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY]. 
4 Id. 
5 See Official Website of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen COP 
15/CMP 5, 7 to 18 December 2009, http://unfcc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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increase resilience to the threats posed by climate change.7  Sadly, 
negotiations broke down at the Copenhagen COP and the Accord8 
that was reached by several key parties outside of the U.N. process in 
the final hours of the COP may do more harm than good for the 
prospects of a full, binding post–2012 agreement.9 
The ongoing negotiations on a post–2012 agreement at the 
international level and implementation of international commitments 
at the national level include a number of hotly contested issues: (1) 
what degree of climate change is acceptable as a basis for emissions 
targets, (2) to what extent and in what ways the mitigation regime 
should incorporate mitigation approaches in developing countries, (3) 
whether the mitigation regime can take advantage of the huge 
mitigation potential of changed practices in the land use and 
agricultural sectors, (4) how adaptation should be financed and at 
what level, and (5) what should be the priorities for adaptation 
funding.  Health concerns should play a crucial role in the resolution 
of all of these issues, but it is by no means certain that they will.  
Current and future health impacts of climate change have garnered 
some attention in recent years, but global environmental governance 
remains grounded in a tradition of natural resources conservation that 
has not always been receptive to what it casts as an anthropocentric 
view of environmental issues.  Although health impacts have played a 
role as an important motivation for environmental regulation,10 
environmental governance structures at the national and international 
level have largely failed to include health advocates and policymakers 
in a coordinated response to environmental health threats.11  At the 
 
7 See generally UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/ 
financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
8 Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, U.N. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, available at http:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/ cop15/eng/l07.pdf (draft decision). 
9 Geoffrey Lean, Copenhagen Blame Game is Obstacle to 2010 Climate Deal, GRIST, 
Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-12-29-copenhagen-blame-game-is-obsta 
cle-to -2010-climate-deal/. 
10 See, e.g., Kira Matus et al., Toward Integrated Assessment of Environmental 
Change: Air Pollution Health Effects in the USA, 88 CLIMATIC CHANGE 59, 63 (2008). 
11 William Onzivu, International Environmental Law, the Public’s Health, and 
Domestic Environmental Governance in Developing Countries, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
597, 660 (2006); cf. UNFCCC, Cooperation with International Organizations, 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/ 
items/2533.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).  The UNFCCC website emphasizes that the 
UNFCCC has been part of significant efforts to enhance coordination among the three Rio 
Conventions, including the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the UNFCCC, all of which are  
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same time, global health governance has referred to environmental 
concerns mostly in passing, noting the role of climate change, for 
example, as one among many transboundary concerns with 
implications for global health,12 but rarely delving into the potential of 
environmental policy as a significant opportunity to better meet the 
basic survival needs of the world’s least healthy people. 
The effects of climate change will be experienced in every region, 
but will disproportionately affect the world’s poorest people.13  In 
addition to creating novel threats to health and shifting the geographic 
scope of existing threats, climate change will also act as to amplify 
current health crises, dramatically increasing the magnitude of 
preexisting problems ranging from poverty, conflict, and hunger to 
infectious and chronic disease burdens.14  In poor countries and in 
poor communities within wealthy countries, the effects will be 
monumentally more devastating.  The world’s poorest and least 
healthy people also have the least capacity to ameliorate the 
potentially devastating effects of climate change.15  Climate change, 
therefore, not only challenges the international community to find 
solutions to reduce the health effects, but also to address the 
inevitable questions of environmental justice. 
In recent years, health advocates have begun to raise the profile of 
health consequences as a major impact of climate change through 
promotions such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) World 
 
environmental treaties.  Id.  It also indicates its appreciation of statements by other 
international organizations, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the World Bank, the UNDP, UNCCD, the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP), and the IPCC, on their efforts to address climate change.  
Id.  The World Health Organization (WHO) is not mentioned, although its governing 
body, the World Health Assembly (WHA), adopted a resolution last year addressing the 
human health impacts of climate change, and indicating that the WHO should advise 
member states regarding those impacts and work together with the UNFCCC to address 
them.  See Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Climate Change and Health, at 2, Res. 
WHA61.19 (May 24, 2008). 
12 See, e.g., Robert M. Pestronk et al., Improving Laws and Legal Authorities for Public 
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 47, 47 (Supp. 2008); 
Thomas E. Novotny, Global Governance and Public Health Security in the 21st Century, 
38 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 19, 29, 34 (2007); William H. Frist, Medicine as a Currency for 
Peace Through Global Health Diplomacy, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 228 (2007). 
13 See generally IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 
393–431 (ch. 8). 
14 See id. at 358–90 (ch. 7). 
15 See id. at 471–506 (ch. 10). 
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Health Day16 and the American Public Health Association’s (APHA) 
Public Health Week,17 both of which focused on climate change in 
2008.  Climate change is expected to act primarily as an intensifier, 
and to some extent a redistributor, of existing threats to health.18  
Direct effects include excess mortality and morbidity due to 
exacerbated air pollution, heat waves, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, 
and other natural disasters.19  Devastating natural disasters have 
indirect effects on health as well, including increased infectious 
disease risk and toxic exposures from contaminated floodwaters or 
unsanitary shelter conditions.20  The mental health impacts of natural 
disasters are also considerable.21  Climate change also creates fertile 
conditions for, and alters the geographic range of, infectious disease 
vectors such as insects and rodents; for example, malaria might be 
introduced into higher altitudes and dengue fever could be carried 
further north.22  Increases in food-borne illnesses, which thrive in 
warmer conditions, are also anticipated.23  Worldwide, scarcity of 
clean, safe water for drinking and sanitation is perhaps the most 
concerning anticipated impact of climate change.  Water scarcity can 
 
16 See World Health Organization, World Health Day 2008: Protecting Health from 
Climate Change, http://www.who.int/world-health-day/previous/2008/en/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
17 See American Public Health Association, Climate Change: Our Health in the 
Balance, http://www.nphw.org/nphw08/default.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
18 See infra Part II (discussing health impacts in greater detail). 
19 See generally Anthony Costello et al., Managing the Health Effects of Climate 
Change, 373 LANCET 1693 (2009). 
20 See generally J.H. Pardue et al., Chemical and Microbiological Parameters in New 
Orleans Floodwater Following Hurricane Katrina, 39 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8591 (2005). 
21 See, e.g., K.L. Middleton et al., Natural Disasters and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Symptom Complex: Evidence from the Oklahoma Tornado Outbreak, 9 INT’L J. STRESS 
MGMT. 229 (2002); Carmen V. Russoniello et al., Childhood Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder and Efforts to Cope After Hurricane Floyd, 28 BEHAVIORAL MED. 61, 61 
(2002); Pierre Verger et al., Assessment of Exposure to a Flood Disaster in a Mental-
Health Study, 13 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 436 (2003); Carol S. 
North et al., The Course of PTSD, Major Depression, Substance Abuse, and Somatization 
After a Natural Disaster, 192 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 823, 823 (2004); Richard 
H. Weisler et al., Mental Health and Recovery in the Gulf Coast After Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, 296 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 585, 585–86 (2006). 
22 See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 407 (ch. 
8); Kathryn Senior, Climate Change and Infectious Disease: A Dangerous Liaison? 8 
LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92 (2008). 
23 See, e.g., R.S. Kovats et al., The Effect of Temperature on Food Poisoning: A Time-
Series Analysis of Salmonellosis in Ten European Countries, 132 EPIDEMIOLOGY & 
INFECTION 443, 443 (2004). 
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be devastating to human health, especially through its impact on 
diarrheal illnesses, which are among the greatest killers of children in 
the developing world.24  Ecosystem changes and water scarcity will in 
turn impair crop, livestock, and fishery yields, exacerbating what is 
already a growing food crisis.25  More remote, but even more 
devastating impacts may come in the form of economic instability, 
migration, and armed conflict in a time of competition for 
increasingly scarce resources.26 
Preventive health strategies focusing on the environment range 
from household measures such as safe water storage and food 
handling practices to energy, transportation, manufacturing, 
agriculture, land use, and urban planning policies—all areas that are 
relevant to the ongoing debates surrounding climate mitigation and 
adaptation approaches.27  A key lesson of environmental health is that 
environmental policy interventions can have significant co-benefits 
for health.28  There can also be significant gains for social and 
economic well-being, despite the fact that environmental health is 
often pitted against economic development considerations in policy 
debates.29  Climate policy adds a new layer to complex relationships 
between the environment, health, and development.  Thus far, 
however, international, national, and even local approaches to climate 
change have been largely driven by an environmental policy 
community that has its foundation in natural resources conservation.  
Unless health policymakers and advocates play a more integral role in 
the negotiation and implementation of environmental and climate 
policy, they may miss important opportunities to reduce the global 
 
24 See generally A. PRÜSS-ÜSTÜN & C. CORVALÁN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
PREVENTING DISEASE THROUGH HEALTHY ENVIRONMENTS: TOWARDS AN ESTIMATE OF 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN OF DISEASE (2006), available at http://www.who.int/ 
quantifying_ehimpacts/publications/preventingdisease.pdf. 
25 See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES [CSIS], A CALL FOR A 
STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TO THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: A REPORT OF THE CSIS TASK 
FORCE ON THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS, CORE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2008), 
available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080728_food_security.pdf. 
26 See id.; see also INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS [IRIN], 
RUNNING DRY: THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006), 
available at http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Running-Dry-IRIN-In-Depth.pdf; 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Climate Change Refugees, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June 2007, at 43. 
27 See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
(Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE]. 
28 See generally PRÜSS-ÜSTÜN & CORVALÁN, supra note 24; Matus et al., supra note 
10. 
29 See generally UNDP, supra note 1. 
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disease burden through policy interventions that have the greatest 
potential for co-benefits for health.  The potential for action on both 
mitigation and adaptation following the Copenhagen COP in 
December 2009 makes this a critical time for health advocacy.  As 
political momentum in support of strong climate change policy builds, 
health advocates must act to ensure that mitigation mechanisms take 
potential co-benefits for health fully into account, and that support for 
global health infrastructure will be a key part of our international 
adaptation response. 
This Article argues that emphasis on climate change as a 
fundamental transformation of our environment that will have 
important consequences for human health has the potential to 
motivate and shape consensus on mitigation of climate change, while 
also improving our global health infrastructure as an adaptation to 
climate change impacts.  Part II focuses on the global health burden 
currently attributable to environmental causes and the anticipated 
health impacts of climate change.  Part III provides background on 
international climate governance under the UNFCCC and the current 
status of negotiations.  Part IV sets forth an agenda for the integration 
of global health concerns into the negotiation of a series of key issues 
currently under debate in the international response to climate change 
and the national implementation of international obligations.  Part V 
offers a conclusion emphasizing the importance of involving global 
health policymakers in the response to climate change. 
I 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
In many ways, environmental health has not received 
policymakers’ attention in proportion to its importance as a source of 
global disease burden.  The WHO estimates that nearly one-quarter of 
the global disease burden, and more than one-third of the disease 
burden among children under age fourteen, is attributable to 
modifiable environmental factors such as unsafe water for drinking 
and sanitation, and air pollution (both indoor and outdoor).30  The 
impact of the environment on human health is seen especially in 
diarrheal illness, lower respiratory infections, unintentional injuries, 
 
30 See PRÜSS-ÜSTÜN & CORVALÁN, supra note 24, at 9 (measuring disease burden in 
terms of disability adjusted life years (DALYs)). 
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and malaria.31  Approximately ninety-four percent of diarrheal illness 
worldwide is attributable to modifiable environmental factors, mostly 
inadequate access to safe drinking water, unsafe sanitation, and poor 
hygiene practices.32  Approximately forty-two percent of malaria is 
attributable to modifiable environmental factors such as land use 
policies and practices, deforestation, water management, settlement 
siting, and house design.33  In turn, diarrheal illness, lower respiratory 
infections, and malaria are among the biggest contributors to the 
global burden of disease.34  The burden of unhealthy environments is 
shouldered disproportionately by children, particularly in the 
developing world.  WHO estimates that more than four million child 
deaths each year are attributable to environmental causes, mostly in 
the developing world, and that the infant death rate from 
environmental causes is twelve times higher in developing countries 
than in developed countries.35  If, as Larry Gostin has suggested, one 
of the goals of global health law and policy should be to meet the 
basic survival needs of the world’s least healthy people,36 then 
environmental health is an excellent starting point.  Climate change 
acts largely as an intensifier and to some extent a redistributor of 
existing threats to health, acting through the same pathways by which 
environmental factors are already contributing to global disease 
burden.37 
Perhaps the most high profile health impact of climate change is an 
increase in the severity and frequency, as well as a geographical shift, 
of extreme weather events.  Heat waves are the health threat that is 
most intuitively connected to climate change, and discussion of the 
climate-health nexus often focuses on recent heat waves in Europe 
and North America, which have caused excess mortality measured in 
tens of thousands of lives.38  Sea level rise has the potential to 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Id. at 11. 
35 Id. 
36 Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World’s Least Healthy 
People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 334 
(2008). 
37 See generally Costello et al., supra note 19. 
38 See, e.g., WHO, Climate and Health: Fact Sheet, July 2005, http://www.who.int/ 
globalchange/news/fsclimandhealth/en/index.html. 
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dramatically increase storm surge,39 which in turn plays an important 
role in determining how destructive a particular storm will be.  The 
geographic distribution of hurricanes and tropical storms will also 
change, bringing greater frequency of severe storms to some areas.40  
An increase in the frequency and severity of floods, which are the 
most common severe weather event, is also likely as rising average 
temperatures intensify evaporation and precipitation in some areas.41  
Out of control wildfires, which are not classified as weather events 
but are strongly affected by weather conditions, are also likely to 
become more frequent and more severe in some areas.42  In addition 
to causing direct injuries, extreme weather events also have less 
obvious effects on health.  Researchers have pointed to the mental 
health effects of disasters as a hidden burden on health.43  We might 
also see increased exposure to infectious pathogens or toxic chemicals 
through contaminated floodwaters or unsanitary living conditions 
following an event.44  Natural disasters can also cause a dangerous 
disruption in health care for those suffering from chronic diseases like 
 
39 See, e.g., Pardue et al., supra note 20, at 8591; Euripides Euripidou & Virginia 
Murray, Public Health Impacts of Floods and Chemical Contamination, 26 J. PUB. 
HEALTH 376, 380 (2004); Burkhard Stachel et al., The Elbe Flood in August 2002—
Organic Contaminants in Sediment Samples Taken After the Flood Event, 40 J. ENVTL. 
SCI. & HEALTH 265, 266 (2005); Carlos del Ninno & Matthias Lundberg, Treading Water: 
The Long-Term Impact of the 1998 Flood on Nutrition in Bangladesh, 3 ECON. & HUMAN 
BIOLOGY 67 (2005). 
40 See, e.g., Mike Ahern et al., Global Health Impacts of Floods: Epidemiologic 
Evidence, 27 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 36, 36 (2005); Robert C. Balling Jr. & Randall S. 
Cerveny, Compilation and Discussion of Trends in Severe Storms in the United States: 
Popular Perception v. Climate Reality, 29 NAT. HAZARDS 103, 107–08 (2003); Kerry 
Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30 Years, 436 
NATURE 686, 686 (2005); P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, 
Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, 1846 (2005). 
41 See, e.g., Axel Bronstert, Floods and Climate Change: Interactions and Impacts, 23 
RISK ANALYSIS 545, 555 (2003); K.E. Kunkel, North American Trends in Extreme 
Precipitation, 29 NAT. HAZARDS 291, 301 (2003); C.A. Senior et al., Predictions of 
Extreme Precipitation and Sea-Level Rise Under Climate Change, 360 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON A 1301 (2002). 
42 See, e.g., Timothy J. Brown et al., The Impact of Twenty-First Century Climate 
Change on Wildland Fire Danger in the Western United States: An Applications 
Perspective, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 365, 366 (2004); Jeremy S. Fried et al., The Impact of 
Climate Change on Wildfire Severity: A Regional Forecast for Northern California, 64 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 169, 170 (2004). 
43 Russoniello et al., supra note 21, at 61; Verger et al., supra note 21, at 436; North et 
al., supra note 21, at 823; Weisler et al., supra note 21, at 585–86. 
44 See, e.g., Pardue et al., supra note 20, at 8591. 
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HIV/AIDS, diabetes, or cardiovascular disease, for which regular 
medication and treatment is necessary. 
Perhaps even more insidious than high-profile extreme weather 
events are the more gradually emerging effects on health anticipated 
as an impact of climate change.  For example, exacerbated air 
pollution will have an impact on cardiovascular and respiratory 
health.45  Rising temperatures result in higher levels of ground level 
ozone pollution (better known as smog), which is formed by chemical 
reactions between certain air pollutants, including nitrogen oxides and 
volatile organic compounds,46 and sunlight.47  While ozone is 
beneficial in the upper atmosphere where it provides protection from 
UV rays, it becomes a harmful pollutant when it forms at ground 
level.  Exposure to ground level ozone pollution can cause short-term, 
reversible diminished lung function as well as more persistent 
inflammation of lung tissue.48  People who live in areas with high 
ozone concentrations are more likely to suffer from respiratory 
disease49 and have a higher risk of premature death.50  Particulate 
matter (PM2.5), which includes all airborne particles that are less than 
2.5 micrometers in diameter, can be either emitted directly from 
sources of pollution or formed through atmospheric reactions, which 
are influenced by rising temperatures, among various pollutant 
 
45 See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 409–12 
(ch. 8). 
46 Volatile organic compounds (VOCs), including carbon dioxide and methane, are 
emitted through the burning of fossil fuels and evaporation from stored fuels, solvents, and 
other chemicals, as well as evaporation from vegetation.  See, e.g., U.S. Geological 
Survey, Volatile Organic Compounds, http://toxics.usgs.gov/definitions/vocs.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
47 See, e.g., Susan M. Bernard et al., The Potential Impacts of Climate Variability and 
Change on Air Pollution-Related Health Effects in the United States, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 199, 202 (Supp. 2 2001). 
48 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Folinsbee et al., Pulmonary Function and Symptom Responses 
After 6.6-hour Exposure to 0.12 ppm Ozone with Moderate Exercise, 38 J. AIR POLLUTION 
CONTROL ASS’N 28, 28 (1988); Robert B. Devlin et al., Exposure of Humans to Ambient 
Levels of Ozone for 6.6 Hours Causes Cellular and Biochemical Changes in the Lung, 4 
AM. J. RESPIRATORY CELL & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 72, 72–73 (1991). 
49 See, e.g., Committee on Environmental Health, American Academy of Pediatrics, 
Ambient Air Pollution: Health Hazards to Children, 114 PEDIATRICS 1699, 1700 (2004); 
Joel Schwartz, Short Term Fluctuations in Air Pollution and Hospital Admissions of the 
Elderly for Respiratory Disease, 50 THORAX 531, 531 (1995); Rob McConnell et al., 
Asthma in Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A Cohort Study, 359 LANCET 386, 386 
(2002). 
50 See, e.g., Michael Jerrett et al., Long-Term Ozone Exposure and Mortality, 360 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1085, 1085 (2009). 
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gases.51  Exposure to air pollution, including PM2.5, has been 
associated with respiratory and cardiovascular effects, ranging from 
coughing and difficulty breathing, diminished lung function, and 
exacerbation of asthma to the development of chronic bronchitis and 
increased incidence of heart attack and arrhythmias.52 
Researchers also anticipate an increased incidence of zoonotic, 
vector-, food-, and water-borne diseases as changing environmental 
conditions affect the survival, persistence, habitat range, and 
transmission of a variety of pathogens.53  Vector-borne infectious 
diseases, such as malaria, dengue fever, West Nile virus, and Lyme 
disease are those that are spread by blood-feeding arthropods such as 
mosquitoes and ticks that carry pathogens from human to human.  
Zoonotic diseases, such as Hantavirus carried by rodents or H5N1 
influenza carried by birds, develop in an animal population reservoir 
and are spread to humans that come into contact with infected 
animals.  Both types of illness are affected by the shifting weather 
patterns that come with climate change as the habitats and size of 
animal populations shift in ways that may bring them into greater 
contact with humans.54  The impact of climate change on malaria and 
 
51 See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fine Particle (PM2.5) 
Designations, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/basicinfo.htm (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
52 See, e.g., Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and 
Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1753 (1993); Jonathan M. 
Samet et al., Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality in 20 U.S. Cities, 1987–1994, 
343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742, 1742 (2000); C. Arden Pope, III et al., Particulate Air 
Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. 
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 669, 669 (1995); C. Arden Pope III & Douglas W. 
Dockery, Health Effects of Fine Particulate Air Pollution: Lines that Connect, 56 J. AIR & 
WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 709, 709 (2006); Francesca Dominici et al., Fine Particulate Air 
Pollution and Hospital Admission for Cardiovascular and Respiratory Diseases, 295 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1127, 1127 (2006); Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate 
Air Pollution and Mortality: Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. 
J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 667, 667 (2006). 
53 See, e.g., IPCC, IMPACT, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 408 
(ch. 8); Senior, supra note 22. 
54 See generally D.J. Rogers & S.E. Randolph, Climate Change and Vector-Borne 
Diseases, 62 ADVANCES IN PARASITOLOGY 345, 353–54 (2006); P. Gale et al., Predicting 
the Impact of Climate Change on Livestock Disease in Great Britain, 162 VETERINARY 
REC. 214, 214 (2008); John S. Brownstein et al., A Climate-Based Model Predicts the 
Spatial Distribution of the Lyme Disease Vector Ixodes Scapularis in the United States, 
111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1152, 1152 (2003); R.S. Kovats et al., Early Effects of 
Climate Change: Do They Include Changes in Vector-Borne Disease?, 356 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1057 (2001); Simon Hales et al., El Niño and  
 214 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 24, 203 
dengue fever, the vector-borne illnesses with the greatest disease 
burden, are particularly concerning.  Increased rainfall and 
temperatures have a significant impact on increasing the length of the 
transmission season and altering the geographic distribution of vector 
mosquitoes, both in terms of latitudinal and altitudinal distribution.55  
Climate change is expected to bring major changes in the risk of 
malaria in areas that are at the edges of current geographical 
distribution.56  Food-borne illness is also sensitive to climate change 
as higher ambient temperatures allow food-borne pathogens to 
thrive.57  Salmonellosis has been shown to be particularly sensitive to 
increased temperatures.58  Campylobacteriosis, on the other hand, is 
less sensitive to changes in temperatures, but is affected by climate 
change as a result of its impact on water scarcity, as discussed 
below.59  Higher ocean surface water temperatures also have an 
impact on food poisoning through the effect of harmful algal blooms60 
and methylation of mercury61 on shellfish and reef fish contamination. 
Scarcity of clean, safe water for drinking and sanitation is perhaps 
the most concerning anticipated impact of climate change.  Water 
scarcity can be devastating to human health,62 especially due to its 
impact on diarrheal illnesses, which are among the greatest killers of 
children in the developing world.63  Incidence of water-borne 
diseases, such as cholera, cryptosporidiosis, and campylobacteriosis, 
is expected to rise as a result of climate change due to droughts, 
which concentrate pathogens in pools, and floods, which increase 
 
the Dynamics of Vectorborne Disease Transmission, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 99 
(1999). 
55 See ICCP, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 407 (ch. 
8). 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Kovats et al., supra note 23, at 443. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., R. Sari Kovats et al., Climate Variability and Campylobacter Infection: An 
International Study, 49 INT’L. J. BIOMETEOROLOGY 207, 210 (2004). 
60 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 400 (ch. 8). 
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., CORRINE J. SCHUSTER-WALLACE ET AL., SAFE WATER AS THE KEY TO 
GLOBAL HEALTH (2008), available at http://www.inweh.unu.edu/Health/docs/ 
2008PolicyBrief.pdf; Bettina Menne & Roberto Bertollini, The Health Impacts of 
Desertification and Drought, DOWN TO EARTH (Convention to Combat Desertification, 
Bonn, F.R.G.), Dec. 2000, at 4. 
63 See PRÜSS-ÜSTÜN & CORVALÁN, supra note 24, at 9 (measuring disease burden in 
terms of DALYs). 
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runoff and microbial contamination of water supplies.64  Water-
washed diseases, illnesses for which the main transmission pathway is 
not through contaminated water, but which are affected by hygiene 
practices and thus sensitive to water scarcity such as rotavirus, are 
also expected to be significantly affected by climate change.65 
Over a longer time horizon, we may see even more serious threats 
to health due to major changes in human settlements and increasing 
armed conflict as a result of climate change and sea level rise.66  We 
could see widespread food and water insecurity on an unprecedented 
scale as the global food and water crises that are already occurring as 
a result of population growth, environmental degradation, and 
economic factors67 are exacerbated by climate change.  The mutually 
reinforcing trends of climate change and environmental degradation 
are “likely to make many parts of the world uninhabitable, or at least 
uneconomic,” potentially resulting in mass migration both within and 
across national borders.68 
II 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
A.  International Cooperation for Climate Change Mitigation and 
Adaptation 
In 1992, most nations of the world including the United States 
signed the UNFCCC, which went into effect in 1994.69  As a 
framework convention, the UNFCCC did not itself create significant 
legally binding obligations.  Rather, it set forth the broad goal of 
stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global climate 
system within a time frame that would allow for natural adaptation of 
ecosystems to climate change, protection of food production, and 
sustainable economic development.70  The UNFCCC’s climate 
 
64 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 401 (ch. 8). 
65 Id. at 400 (ch. 8). 
66 See, e.g., LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B 3.0: MOBILIZING TO SAVE CIVILIZATION 
(2008). 
67 See CSIS, supra note 25; see also IRIN, supra note 26. 
68 Sachs, supra note 26, at 43. 
69 See UNFCCC, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
70 UNFCCC art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
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change mitigation policy is directed primarily at industrialized 
countries, and its original goal was to stabilize those countries’ GHG 
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.  As of 2009, 192 countries 
had ratified the UNFCCC.71 
In 1997, following particularly tense negotiations at the Kyoto 
COP to the UNFCCC, the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which 
went into force in 2005.72  In the agreement that was eventually 
hashed out despite considerable discord between the U.S. and EU 
delegations, thirty-seven developed countries and the European 
community, listed in Annex 1, agreed to reduce their emissions of 
GHGs to at least five percent below 1990 levels by 2012.73  
Developing countries were not committed to binding targets, though 
they had the option of establishing voluntary targets.74  In addition to 
emissions reduction targets, the agreement established a system of 
emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean development 
mechanisms to encourage cooperation between developed and 
developing countries to reduce emissions.  Although the United States 
signed the Protocol, it is the only major developed country that has 
not ratified it.  In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed a unanimous 
resolution stating that the United States should not be a signatory to 
any protocol that did not include binding emissions reduction targets 
for developing as well as developed countries.75  The Clinton 
administration never sent the Protocol to the Senate for ratification, 
and the Bush administration openly opposed ratification, arguing that 
China and India were not bound to emissions reduction targets, and 
that participation in such a regime would unjustifiably disadvantage 
the U.S. economy against these emerging competitors.76 
B.  Negotiation of a Successor to the Kyoto Protocol 
Because the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and 
because virtually all of the countries that did ratify have thus far fallen 
 
71 See UNFCCC, Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/ 
items/2627.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
72 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
76 See, e.g., Tony Karon, When it Comes to Kyoto, the U.S. is the “Rogue Nation,” 
TIME, July 24, 2001, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,168701,00.html; 
Bush Faces Up to Kyoto Critics, BBC NEWS, June 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/1382564.stm. 
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far short of meeting their obligations under it,77 the Kyoto Protocol 
has been widely regarded as a failure.78  In any case, the commitments 
contained in the Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012 and the UNFCCC 
member states began to sketch out what a successor GHG emissions 
reduction regime might look like, and to establish milestones to stay 
on track for negotiation of a successor protocol.  At the 2007 COP in 
Bali, the United States joined other nations in agreeing to negotiate a 
successor protocol by the end of 2009 as part of the Bali Action 
Plan.79  Although a change in the U.S. presidential administration may 
make U.S. participation in the Kyoto successor regime possible, any 
agreement would still have to be ratified by two-thirds of the U.S. 
Senate.  Unfortunately, ratification by such a majority is unlikely 
unless emerging economies that are important competitors for the 
United States are bound to emissions reduction targets.  Draft 
agreements were presented by the chair and discussed by the parties 
during negotiation sessions in Bonn, Germany, in June and August of 
2009.80  Ultimately, however, much of the substance of the new 
mitigation regime was left unsettled leading up to the December 2009 
COP in Copenhagen.81  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
 
77 Environment: Call for Agreement to Replace Kyoto Protocol, KEESING’S WORLD 
NEWS ARCHIVES, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.keesings.com/breaking_history/ 
international/environment_call_for_agreement_to_replace_kyoto_protocol_pub._aug._28,
_2009/environment_call_for_agreement_to_replace_kyoto_protocol_-_full_text. 
78 See, e.g., Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to Ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973 
(2007); Patrick J. Michaels, Lessons of Kyoto, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2007, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NzYwMjZkNDQwNjczOGUyMTBhZWVhMjRjNjF
lMDVhNDg.  In the lead-up to the Copenhagen COP, some commentators sought to dispel 
the generally accepted notion that Kyoto was an abject failure, presumably in an effort to 
combat popular perception that emissions reductions would not be ensured even if parties 
were successful in their efforts to negotiation binding limits at the COP.  See, e.g., Bill 
Chameides, Did the Kyoto Protocol Miss the Target? HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-chameides/did-the -kyoto-protocol-mi_b_317855.html 
(arguing that it is too early to declare Kyoto a failure and that “[i]n all likelihood when 
2012 rolls around, we will find that overall its Annex B countries will have cut emissions 
by more than the intended 5.2 percent”). 
79 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Bali Action Plan, Dec. 1/CP.13, in Report on 
Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 
(Mar. 14, 2008). 
80 See UNFCCC, Bonn Climate Change Talks—June 2009, http://unfccc.int/meetings/ 
sb30/items/4842.php; UNFCCC, Bonn Climate Change Talks—August 2009, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/intersessional/bonn_09_2/items/4913.php. 
81 Sven Harmeling & Christoph Bals, Political Will at the Highest Level Needed: A 
Hesitant Beginning to the “Countdown to Copenhagen” at the Climate Negotiations in 
Bonn, June 2009, GERMANWATCH, http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/sb30rese.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
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Change (IPCC) had recommended that in the Copenhagen agreement 
industrialized countries must commit to reducing their emissions by 
twenty-five to forty percent compared to 1990 levels by 2020 to 
remain close to a two degrees Celsius rise in average temperatures.82  
Early on, it became apparent that such a commitment was unlikely.  
At the 2008 COP in Poznan, the European Union, Norway, and 
Switzerland were among the only parties who expressed some 
willingness to seriously negotiate on this point.83 
Ultimately, the 2009 COP utterly failed to achieve a full, U.N.-
based agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol.  Two weeks of 
negotiations were plagued by delays and seemingly insoluble 
disagreements.  Then, at the last minute the United States and China, 
joined by key rapidly industrializing countries India, Brazil, and 
South Africa, attempted to salvage the COP with the Copenhagen 
Accord.  The agreement includes a relatively vague commitment to 
work towards curbing global temperature rise to below two degrees 
Celsius.84  The Accord is voluntary and postpones setting binding 
targets, but it does bring together key parties that are not subject to 
emissions reduction under Kyoto.85  Interestingly, the Accord was 
negotiated outside of the UNFCCC process and was noted, but not 
adopted by the UNFCCC member states at the close of the 
Copenhagen COP.86  How the Accord and the failure at Copenhagen 
will affect future efforts to negotiate a full post–2012 agreement is at 
this point unclear.87  Many commentators have noted that 
Copenhagen and the lead-up to it revealed serious flaws in the U.N. 
 
82 IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27, at 776. 
83 CHRISTOPH BALS, BETWEEN POZNAN AND COPENHAGEN: THE CLIMATE TRAIN IN 
THE “VALLEY OF DEATH” 4 (2009), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ 
c14rese.pdf. 
84 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 8. 
85 U.S., China Step Forward in Climate Debate (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 24, 2009), 
http://weblogs.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=121846177. 
86 Press Release, Friends of the Earth, UN Climate Conference Closes Without 
Adopting ‘Copenhagen Accord’ (Dec. 19, 2009), available at http://www.foe.org/un          
-climate-conference-closes-without-adopting-copenhagen-accord; Summary of the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS 
BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 22, 2009, at 1–2, available 
at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12459e.pdf (“During informal negotiations 
facilitated by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon during the night and early morning, 
parties agreed to adopt a COP decision whereby the COP ‘takes note’ of the Copenhagen 
Accord, which was attached to the decision as an unofficial document.”). 
87 See, e.g., Lean, supra note 9 (summarizing various positions laying blame for the 
failure at Copenhagen). 
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negotiating regime, which could continue to stymie efforts in 2010 
and beyond if they are not addressed.88 
C.  The Adaptation Regime 
Whereas mitigation efforts seek to avoid harmful anthropogenic 
climate change, or at least reduce its extent, adaptation efforts seek to 
reduce the vulnerability of human settlements to the impacts of 
climate change.  Adaptation measures seek to build “ecological and 
social community resilience to climate change.”89  Ecological 
resiliency includes “protecting and preserving the natural ecosystems 
that help human communities survive through buffering from floods, 
filtering drinking water, stabilizing soil, providing sustainable forest 
products, and preserving a host of other ecosystem services necessary 
for human survival.”90  In the context of climate governance under the 
UNFCCC, ecological resiliency is not pursued for the purpose of 
“preserving functioning ecosystems and their myriad component 
species for their own sake,”91 though that is a purpose of other 
international environmental agreements such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.92  Social resiliency includes “forging the 
democratic capacity to help marginalized communities accrue the 
administrative, technical, and political power that will help them 
make difficult decisions and survive the coming vicissitudes of nature 
and the coming economic and political upheavals . . . that are now 
befalling and will continue to befall them.”93  More specific to the 
concerns of global health law, adaptation of human systems includes 
the building of capacity, including through law and policy reform, to 
face the anticipated health impacts of climate change. 
 
88 See, e.g., Joe Churcher, Gordon Brown: Small Number of Countries Held 
Copenhagen Talks to Ransom, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 21, 2009.  U.N. Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon has called for investigation of potential reforms to the U.N. negotiations process.  
See United Action on Global Scale Needed to Cinch New Climate Pact, Says Ban, UN 
NEWS CENTRE, Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story 
.asp?NewsID=33311&Cr=copenhagen&Cr1=. 
89 David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change 
Adaptation, and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 43 
(2009). 
90 Id. at 44. 
91 Id. 
92 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
93 Takacs, supra note 89, at 44. 
 220 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 24, 203 
Article 2 of the UNFCCC sets a goal of stabilizing atmospheric 
GHG emissions at a level that would “allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.”94  Since it has become increasingly clear that 
mitigating climate change is unlikely to be achieved, at least to the 
point where natural adaptation is possible, attention has shifted to 
planned adaptation of human systems.  The concept of planned 
adaptation of human systems to climate change has always been a 
part of the UNFCCC.  For example, Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC 
requires that developed countries “shall also assist the developing 
country [p]arties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse 
effects.”95  Until relatively recently, however, adaptation has taken a 
backseat to mitigation efforts. 
Focus on adaptation has been somewhat controversial within the 
environmental advocacy and climate science communities because 
some fear that it will reduce the impetus for mitigation efforts by 
admitting that mitigation efforts are unlikely to reduce anthropogenic 
climate change at a fast enough rate to prevent significant impacts, 
and by casting those impacts as manageable through technological 
and social advances.96  On the other hand, by “shift[ing] the question 
from whether impacts from climate change will occur in the near 
term, and whether some portion will be unacceptable, to the hows of 
achieving some control over the more dire consequences expected,”97 
the adaptation question has in some ways moved the climate 
community forward, and has created the opportunity for greater 
engagement of scientific, advocacy, and policy communities in other 
fields, including agriculture and global health.  Additionally, the focus 
on adaptation, by making the discussion of climate change impacts 
more concrete, is also more amenable to the framing of climate 
change as an environmental justice issue.  Research on projected 
impacts, and on the likely vulnerability and adaptation capacity of 
 
94 UNFCCC, supra note 70, at art. 2. 
95 Id. at art. 4.4. 
96 See, e.g., Mark Hertsgaard, On the Front Lines of Climate Change, TIME, Apr. 9, 
2007, at 102; Rick Salutin, Adaptation Equals Doing Nothing, RABBLE.CA, Feb. 9, 2007, 
http://www.rabble.ca/columnists/adaptation-equals-doing-nothing. 
97 Preface to INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH WITH ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE: LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW DIRECTIONS, at xviii (Kristie L. Ebi et al. eds., 
2005). 
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various regions, highlights the fact that climate change is largely 
driven by industrialized nations.98  Yet, the adverse impacts of climate 
change will be felt first and foremost by those in developing nations 
who have the least capacity to adapt to such impacts.99 
In 2006, at the Nairobi COP, member states negotiated the 
establishment of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the Nairobi 
Work Program on Adaptation.100  The Fund is generated by a two 
percent tax levied on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects, which are emissions offset projects undertaken by 
industrialized countries, primarily by way of private enterprises in the 
developing world.101  This innovative funding mechanism has the 
potential to create an adaptation budget that could be as much as five 
times the budgets of the two previously created climate change funds, 
which relied on direct funding from donor countries.102  The 
Adaptation Fund is expected to generate between $160 and $950 
million per year between now and 2012, the year the Kyoto Protocol 
expires.103  The Fund is dedicated to enabling concrete adaptation 
activities, and experts are anticipating a frenzy of proposals seeking a 
piece of the pie. 
 
98 See Costello et al., supra note 19, at 1712. 
99 See id. 
100 Benito Müller, The Nairobi Climate Change Conference: A Breakthrough for 
Adaptation Funding, OXFORD ENERGY & ENV’T COMMENT, Jan. 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0107-1.pdf. 
101 The CDM has a somewhat controversial past.  It grew out of a proposal by Brazil, 
with the support of the G-77 nations, as a means to compel Annex 1 countries to meet their 
emissions reduction targets by requiring a fine for emissions in excess of their targeted 
limits.  Takacs, supra note 89, at 53–54.  The fines would then be used to fund mitigation 
and adaptation projects in developing countries.  Id.  Eventually, however, the program 
morphed into a mechanism for allowing industrialized countries, and more specifically 
private actors within them, to avoid real emissions reductions while making a profit at the 
same time.  Id.  Private enterprises can use CDM projects in developing countries, 
primarily China, Brazil, Mexico, and India, which have the infrastructure to meet the 
bureaucratic and technical requirements imposed by the CDM to offset requirements 
imposed on them by their respective governments.  Id.  They can also profit by selling or 
trading credits in an emissions trading regime.  Id. 
Much, if not most of the U.N.-sponsored effort in the past ten years around climate 
change has gone into making a functional CDM, much to the benefit of business 
interests around the world.  Private actors generated $US30 billion per year worth 
of CDM projects in 2006, the first year after the Kyoto Protocol went into effect. 
Id. at 54. 
102 Müller, supra note 100, at 2. 
103 Id. 
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The Adaptation Fund Board has indicated that it wishes to 
implement “[a]daptation activities where sufficient information is 
available to warrant such activities, inter alia, in the areas of: (i) water 
resources management, (ii) land management, (iii) agriculture, (iv) 
health, (v) infrastructure development, (vi) fragile ecosystems, 
including mountainous ecosystems, and (vii) integrated coastal zone 
management.”104  Because the United States has not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, it does not currently have any direct means of influencing 
decisions with respect to the Adaptation Fund.  Instead, the European 
Union has taken on a leadership role.  Significant progress was made 
in 2008 and 2009 on readying the Adaptation Fund for 
implementation.  The basic structure of the fund was established, and 
the groundwork was laid for a large-scale finance architecture to be 
negotiated in Copenhagen.105  Much to the chagrin of developing 
countries, however, industrialized countries expressed considerable 
reluctance toward increasing the funding through a variety of 
mechanisms that have been proposed.106   
Financing of adaptation in developing countries is intimately 
linked to the potential success of a post–2012 mitigation regime.107  
Developing countries at the Bali COP in 2007 expressed that their 
willingness to participate in the mitigation regime hinged on the 
scaling up of funding for adaptation.108  Indeed, funding for 
adaptation in developing countries was a major focus of negotiations 
at the Copenhagen COP.109  Ultimately, in the Copenhagen Accord, 
developed countries committed to a short-term financing goal of 
approximately $80 billion for the period from 2010 to 2012, with a 
balance between mitigation and adaptation, and a long-term goal of 
 
104 Adaptation Fund Board, Draft Provisional Operational Policies and Guidelines for 
Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund, at 7, AFB/B3.8 (Aug. 26, 2008), 
available at http://www.adaptation-fund.org/images/AFB.B.3.8_Operational_Policies_and 
_Guidelines_08.26.08_-_revised.1.pdf. 
105 See Sven Harmeling & Alpha Kaloga, Adaptation Fund: Critical Progress at the 7th 
Meeting, GERMANWATCH, Sept. 2009, available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ 
afb2009-09r.pdf. 
106 SVEN HARMELING, ADAPTATION UNDER THE UNFCCC—THE ROAD FROM BONN 
TO POZNAN 2008, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ 
bonnadapt08e.pdf. 
107 See Eric J. Lyman, Kyoto: Power Shift in the Making, ISN SECURITY WATCH, June 
19, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=102025& 
Ing=en. 
108 BALS, supra note 83, at 4. 
109 See Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7–19 December 
2009, supra note 86, at 3. 
 2009] Healthy Planet, Healthy People 223 
$100 billion by 2020 “to address the needs of developing 
countries.”110  At this point, it is not clear how much of this funding 
will be committed to adaptation or whether any of it will flow through 
the UNFCC Adaptation Fund.111 
Although recent developments indicate significant progress on the 
development of an adaptation regime under the UNFCCC, adaptation 
in the developing countries that are at greatest risk of catastrophic 
climate impacts suffers from an implementation gap,112 as funds have 
not been provided and the infrastructure required to make use of 
adaptation funding is not in place in the poorest countries.113  One of 
the great ironies of climate change adaptation is that countries that are 
likely to see the least severe impacts from climate change have spent 
monumentally more on adaptation within their borders than they have 
donated to adaptation in the poorest countries, where far more 
significant impacts will be felt.114  While developed nations are 
currently spending about $40 million per year to fund adaptation in 
developing countries, they are spending about $40 billion per year on 
their own adaptation projects.115 
III 
THE ROLE OF HEALTH ADVOCACY IN THE NEGOTIATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A POST–2012 FRAMEWORK 
A.  Putting a Human Face on Climate Change 
Policymakers, advocates, and scholars alike have noted that putting 
a human face on climate change could be the key to generating the 
massive amount of political will that will be required to effectively 
respond to climate change.  Roberto Bertolini of the WHO says that 
 
110 United States Climate Action Network, Understanding the Copenhagen Accord, 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/understanding-the-copenhagen-accord (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2010). 
111 ALPHA KALOGA & SVEN HARMELING, THE ADAPTATION FUND IN COPENHAGEN: 
SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/ 
klima/afb2009-12.pdf. 
112 Id. 
113 Takacs, supra note 89, at 53 (stating that eighty percent of CDM projects, which 
develop mitigation and adaptation capacity in the developing world, are in Brazil, China, 
Mexico, and India, where infrastructure is advanced enough to meet the bureaucratic and 
technical requirements imposed by the CDM). 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 13–15. 
115 Takacs, supra note 89, at 56 (citing Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt 
as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at A1). 
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he hopes that climate change will bring to mind the image of a 
malnourished child in Africa dying of diarrheal illness rather than the 
image of a drowning polar bear.116  Lisa Heinzerling, a legal scholar 
who was recently named Senior Climate Counselor to the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, has argued 
that the characterization of climate change as “knowing killing” of 
people in the developing world creates a moral obligation on the part 
of industrialized countries to respond.117  At the opening session of 
the Copenhagen COP, Algeria spoke for African member states 
highlighting the fact that “Africans are already impacted by climate 
change through increased droughts, health hazards, food scarcity and 
migration.”118 
But beyond these broad strokes and general references to the 
connection between climate change and global health, what are the 
concrete opportunities for health advocates to influence the 
international response to this emerging threat?  As a good starting 
point, putting a human face on climate change has an important role 
to play in reaching an agreement on a limit beyond which the extent 
of climate change becomes unacceptable.  As discussed above, the 
objective of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”119  
What that level is and what the timeframe should be is still a matter of 
debate. 
The goal that gained consensus in negotiations leading up to 
Copenhagen, but agreement upon which is still far from certain, is to 
limit global warming to a global mean surface temperature rise of two 
degrees Celsius.  In the months leading up to Copenhagen, a growing 
number of parties began calling for an even stricter limit of 1.5 
degrees Celsius, based on concerns that the impacts even at a two 
degrees Celsius increase are unacceptable.120  The European Union, 
Norway, Iceland, African nations, and Chile joined the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) in campaigning for this stricter limit, and 
 
116 Conversation with Roberto Bertolini, Dir., Special Programme on Health & Env’t, 
World Health Org. (Jan. 21, 2009). 
117 Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary 
Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 460 (2008). 
118 See Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7–19 December 
2009, supra note 86, at 3. 
119 UNFCCC, supra note 70, at art. 2. 
120 See BALS, supra note 83, at 6. 
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other developing countries indicated that they may join the effort as 
well.121  IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri stated that the two 
degrees Celsius limit may not be ambitious enough, and activist Al 
Gore publicly called for a 1.5 degrees Celsius limit.122  The 
Copenhagen Accord commits parties to a two degrees Celsius limit, 
but also includes ambiguous language regarding further investigation 
of a 1.5 degrees Celsius limit.123 
Even to limit global warming to an increase of two degrees 
Celsius, the IPCC has recommended that GHG emissions must be 
reduced by twenty-five to forty percent of 1990 levels by 2020.124  By 
way of comparison, in the fall of 2009 the Obama administration 
indicated a willingness to cut emissions to 1990 levels, the so called 
“zero percent target,” by 2020.125  The Kyoto Protocol commits thirty-
seven industrialized countries and the European Union to reducing 
emissions to five percent below 1990 levels by 2012, and parties have 
failed to meet even those modest targets.126  The European Union 
recently indicated willingness to commit to a thirty percent reduction 
below 1990 levels by 2020, contingent upon an agreement by other 
nations to do the same.127  Although this was the most ambitious 
target announced by any industrialized country, experts believe that 
even a reduction of this scale may not be sufficient to limit global 
warming to under two degrees Celsius.128 
The campaign for consideration of a 1.5 degrees Celsius pathway 
has been driven in large part by arguments regarding sovereignty and 
the claim that no nation’s survival is negotiable.129  In addition to 
considering whether some small island states would cease to exist 
altogether under the two degrees Celsius scenario, however, 
 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 8, ¶ 12 (“We call for an assessment of the 
implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015, including in light of the 
Convention’s ultimate objective.  This would include consideration of strengthening the 
long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation 
to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.”). 
124 BALS, supra note 83, at 4. 
125 See John Heilprin, Obama on Climate Change: U.S. ‘Determined to Act,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/22/un-cli 
mate-summit-puts-ch_n_294409.html. 
126 Environment: Call for Agreement to Replace Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77. 
127 See BALS, supra note 83, at 9. 
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policymakers should highlight the considerable difference in impacts, 
particularly health impacts, that might be seen between the two paths.  
The two degrees Celsius limit appears to be the point at which sea 
level rise would be severe enough that millions more people would 
experience coastal flooding,130 though increasingly scientists believe 
that point may be reached at the 1.5 degrees Celsius mark.  Most of 
the health impacts described above begin at the 0.5 degrees Celsius 
point, however, and some of them are already in evidence today.  
Localized impacts on food security are currently in evidence, but 
experts believe that decreases in crop yields will become widespread 
by the one degree Celsius point, and will reach critical levels by 3.5 
degrees Celsius.131  Water stress is increased at an extremely low 
threshold and worsens rapidly with increasing average 
temperatures.132  More research is needed to assess the relationship 
between the severity of health impacts and increasing average 
temperatures, but the argument here is that emphasis on health 
impacts likely to be felt by a large portion of the world’s population 
may be more persuasive than primarily pointing toward individual 
nations with relatively small populations that will be utterly 
devastated. 
B.  Sectoral Approaches to Mitigation with Co-Benefits for Health 
In addition to providing a more compelling justification for climate 
change mitigation, health concerns might shape the contours of the 
mitigation regime at the international level, as well as national level 
implementation of international obligations.  Health advocates should 
pay particular attention to the incorporation of land use regulation into 
climate change mitigation strategies.  Worldwide, poor land use 
management, particularly deforestation, accounts for a greater share 
of GHG emissions than either the transportation or industrial 
sectors—more than twenty percent of total emissions.133  Creation and 
maintenance of biological sinks for carbon is a difficult area to 
regulate due to monitoring and measurement challenges, but it has 
important co-benefits for health, as well as for biodiversity and 
 
130 See, e.g., IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 
688–716 (ch. 16). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See D. Schoene & M. Netto, The Kyoto Protocol: What Does it Mean for Forests 
and Forestry?, 56 UNASYLVA 3 (2005). 
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support of sustainable livelihoods.134  Reforestation and avoided 
deforestation have gained ground in UNFCCC negotiations and may 
play a significant role in the post–2012 mitigation regime, primarily 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).135  Promotion of 
sustainable agricultural practices to reduce emissions and increase 
sinks has not played a major role in international climate governance, 
but could still be an important part of national level strategies to meet 
targets imposed by Kyoto and its successor.  Of course, the 
incorporation of land use, forest-based, and agricultural mitigation 
approaches into the post–Kyoto regime should be undertaken in such 
a way that it will supplement, rather than supplant, emissions 
reductions from more traditional sources in the industrialized world.  
Transport,136 industrial,137 and energy138 sector emissions also have 
more direct, local impacts on health in addition to their impact 
through climate change.  Most experts agree, moreover, that 
mitigation from all sectors and in both industrialized and developing 
nations will be necessary to hold the extent and rate of climate change 
within boundaries that allow for successful adaptation.139 
Proponents of forest-based mitigation approaches see reforestation, 
whereby “a project developer plants trees to reforest a degraded 
ecosystem,”140 and avoided deforestation, whereby a project 
 
134 Mohamed T. El-Ashry, An Overview of this Issue: Framework for a Post-Kyoto 
Climate Change Agreement, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2008, at 2, 3. 
135 Takacs, supra note 89, at 57–58 (noting that “[c]urrent Kyoto Protocol rules allow 
only [one] percent of carbon credits under the CDM to be allotted for projects in Land 
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)” and that avoided deforestation projects 
“are currently excluded from CDM eligibility, but it is expected they will be a part of the 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol”). 
136 The transportation sector’s current reliance on fossil fuels plays a major role in 
ground-level ozone and particulate matter air pollution with its resulting impacts on 
cardiovascular and respiratory health.  See, e.g., AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CLIMATE 
CHANGE IS A PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE (2008), available at http://www.nphw.org/nphw08/ 
NPHW%202008%20Blueprint.pdf.  A shift to greater use of public transportation and 
nonmotorized transport has significant co-benefits for health in terms of reduction in 
obesity and cardiovascular disease and improved mental health.  Id. 
137 Industrial emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs have impacts on air, soil, 
and water pollution with resulting impacts on health.  See supra Part II. 
138 The energy sector’s current reliance on coal-fired power plants has significant 
impacts on air pollution, as well as soil and water pollution, with resulting health impacts.  
See generally Frederica Perera et al., Benefits of Reducing Prenatal Exposure to Coal-
Burning Pollutants to Children’s Neurodevelopment in China, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 1396 (2008). 
139 IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27, at 542–84 (ch. 9). 
140 Takacs, supra note 89, at 56. 
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developer “ensures that a forest that would have otherwise been 
degraded or felled is, instead, preserved,”141 as opportunities to 
mitigate climate change by reducing emissions and increasing sinks, 
while at the same time building ecological and social resilience to the 
impacts of climate change.  Forests perform a wide range of 
ecological services that will be in ever greater demand in the face of 
global climate change: stabilization of local climate fluctuations, 
drought prevention, aquifer protection, preservation of pollinator 
populations, soil stabilization, and buffering from storms and 
floods.142  Deforestation has a major impact on the health of local 
populations in addition to its indirect impact on global health through 
climate change.143 
Some have expressed concerns, however, that Forest Carbon Offset 
(FCO) projects, if not carefully governed, could be manipulated to 
allow private industry to profit from projects that it would have 
undertaken anyway, even in the absence of a carbon trading 
mechanism that takes them into account.144  Such manipulation could 
be accomplished by using the extra carbon credits generated to allow 
emissions from industrialized nations to continue unabated.145  
Incorporation of FCO projects into the Kyoto Protocol was 
intentionally circumscribed based on concerns that experts have 
classified into four main categories: leakage, permanence, 
additionality, and quantifiability.146  Leakage refers to the concern 
that stakeholders who formerly relied on felling trees in a forest that 
becomes protected will simply move their operations elsewhere.  For 
example, “a government may preserve one forest from planned 
 
141 Id. at 56–57. 
142 Id. at 57 (citing VALERIE KAPOS ET AL., UNEP, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION: A KEY OPPORTUNITY FOR ATTAINING MULTIPLE BENEFITS 9–10 
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eds., 2002); David Freestone, Foreword to CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING 
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143 See, e.g., Yaw A. Afrane et al., Deforestation and Vectorial Capacity of Anopheles 
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DISEASES 1533 (2008). 
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146 See Imke Sagemüller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for 
Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 195–96 (2006). 
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logging and instead offer timber concessions elsewhere [or] logging 
companies denied concession rights in one country may instead cut 
timber in a neighboring country.”147  Permanence refers to the 
concern that carbon sinks may be destroyed in the future as forests 
burn or are eventually encroached upon by other land uses, resulting 
in an eventual increase in emissions that offsets the temporary sink.148  
Additionality refers to the concern that some FCO projects would 
have been undertaken even in the absence of a carbon credit, based 
purely on profit motive.  The result is a net increase in emissions as 
carbon credits awarded to projects that would have been undertaken 
anyway are used to avoid emission reductions in other sectors.149  
Finally, quantifiability refers to problems of measurement, 
monitoring, reporting, and verification associated with “calculating 
present and future carbon stored in forests, particularly under different 
climate change scenarios,”150 as well as the difficulties of regulating a 
system that is more irregular in terms of its inputs and outputs than 
the transportation, energy, and industry sectors. 
This is obviously an area where there is a significant threat that 
potential benefits may not be realized if the regulatory mechanism 
does not adequately take these special considerations into account. 
Incorporation of FCOs into the UNFCCC mitigation regime in the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) 
program was an important focus of the Copenhagen COP and the 
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Meizlish & David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon Projects for the Voluntary Carbon 
Market: A Practical Analysis, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY 
AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 142, at 311, 317; Sebastian M. Scholz & 
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negotiations leading up to it.  The Copenhagen Accord includes a 
paragraph on REDD151 and an incomplete draft decision on the issue 
was also developed at the COP.152  Given that this is a hotly contested 
issue among the environmental policy community, health 
policymakers have an opportunity to highlight the co-benefits for 
health of reforestation, and especially avoided deforestation, as a 
consideration that might tip the scale in favor of investing the 
considerable resources that will be required to regulate this area 
adequately if it is to be included in the mitigation regime. 
Agricultural practices also play an important role in determining 
GHG emissions and carbon sinks.  Agriculture accounts for roughly 
ten to twelve percent  of global anthropogenic GHG emissions.153  
The link to deforestation, much of which is prompted by agricultural 
expansion, is also important for global emissions.154  Production and 
use of nitrogen-based fertilizers, use of fossil fuels for agricultural 
production, animal waste management, and livestock enteric 
fermentation are all important sources of GHG emissions, which can 
be reduced by improvements in management practices.155  At the 
same time, sustainable agricultural practices such as conservation 
tillage, cover cropping, and crop rotation practices can increase 
carbon sinks.156  The IPCC has estimated that there is potential for 
mitigation in the agricultural sector of the equivalent of 5.5–6 
gigatons of carbon dioxide per year by 2030.157  For reference, total 
global emissions in 2000 were equivalent to forty-three gigatons of 
carbon dioxide.158  The vast majority of this potential is in soil carbon 
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reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance 
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sequestration, which is the use of sustainable agricultural practices 
such as conservation tillage, cover cropping, and crop rotation to 
increase carbon sinks by increasing the amount of carbon sequestered 
in soil.159  Reduction in methane emissions through improved 
management of livestock and rice farming practices, as well as 
reduction in nitrogen emissions through cropland management 
practices, round out the remaining potential for mitigation.160 
The huge potential for agricultural mitigation is made even more 
attractive by the fact that it is a relatively low-cost approach.  Many 
abatement options are cost neutral or even net profit positive and 
require relatively low capital investment, in part because the required 
technology is already well developed.161  If agriculture industry 
players are allowed to trade the carbon credits they generate through 
low-cost interventions with players in other industries where 
mitigation is more costly, then the result will actually be profit for the 
agriculture industry.  Thus, the incorporation of the agricultural sector 
into a GHG trading mechanism has the potential to subsidize, rather 
than impede, sustainable agricultural development, which in turn has 
significant benefits not only for climate change adaptation, but for 
meeting routine needs in the short term as well.  Seventy-five percent 
of the world’s poor live in rural areas in developing countries, and 
agriculture is the primary sector of the economy in most developing 
countries.162  In addition to contributing to food security, sustainable 
agricultural development can promote poverty reduction in 
surrounding communities while preserving the resilience of agro-
ecosystems.163 
Despite these potential benefits, however, agricultural mitigation is 
even less far along in its incorporation into international climate 
governance than forest-based mitigation.  Agriculture-based carbon 
sinks through soil carbon sequestration are not currently eligible for 
 
159 The same practices that improve soil quality with decreased use of fertilizers can 
also increase the amount of carbon sequestered in soil.  See Perry Miller et al., Soil Carbon 
Sequestration in Agriculture: Farm Management Practices Can Affect Greenhouse Gas 
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160 FAO, supra note 154, at 1. 
161 Id. at 1–2 (citing IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27); 
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162 FAO, supra note 154, at 2. 
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CDM project status absent a very narrow research-based exception,164 
and the CDM itself makes up a relatively small part of the mitigation 
regime.  Agricultural sequestration poses the same difficulties of 
permanence, leakage, additionality, and quantifiability165 that the 
forestry and land use sector presents.166  However, according to the 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the technology for 
measuring soil carbon sequestration is perhaps farther along than 
policymakers realize.167  Furthermore, FAO notes that leakage is less 
likely to be a concern in the agricultural sector than in the forestry 
sector due to the likelihood that incorporation of agricultural 
mitigation operations is likely to be maintained and may even expand, 
rather than decrease, agricultural production.168  Permanence, on the 
other hand, may be a greater concern in the agricultural sector than in 
the forestry sector, given that sustainable agricultural practices would 
need to be continued year after year to preserve the sequestration of 
carbon in soil and biomass.169 
The greatest barrier to enabling agricultural mitigation approaches 
is not technology or cost to the agricultural sector, but rather the lack 
of financial and regulatory mechanisms that can accommodate the 
attributes that set the agricultural sector apart from other regulated 
sectors like transportation, energy, and industry.  In addition to the 
concerns discussed above, the agricultural sector is also a difficult 
area for climate change mitigation because of the “sheer size of land 
areas under agriculture around the world (but at the same time this 
breadth of opportunity, which exceeds that of forestry, is part of its 
potential)[,] the variation in agroecosystems and farming systems, 
[and] the large numbers of farmers that would need to be involved.”170 
Unlike the forestry and land use sectors, incorporating agricultural 
sector mitigation opportunities into the international framework is far 
more complicated than simply scaling up the CDM.  “Not only are 
many sources of agricultural mitigation not allowed under CDM, but 
its project-based and offsets approach does not generate the breadth 
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and scale of incentives that are needed.”171  Whereas mitigation in the 
forestry sector requires only that investors preserve forests or reforest 
degraded land, “[c]apturing the full potential of agricultural 
mitigation and its co-benefits requires widespread changes in 
agricultural production systems, which in turn requires changes in 
policy, institutions and technologies and a much broader approach by 
mitigation financing mechanisms.”172  In particular, innovative policy 
and financing solutions must: provide equal opportunities for both 
small-scale land holders and large-scale land owners; provide equal 
opportunities for rights to emissions; allow for effective incentivizing 
and enjoyment of co-benefits; allow tradable rights to emissions 
reductions to be held by land users, based on traditional as well as 
formal systems of property rights; make options for emissions 
crediting and trading flexible enough to allow for the diversity of 
mitigation approaches that might be appropriate in a particular local 
context; and ensure that expanded agricultural development that takes 
advantage of emissions trading opportunities conforms with 
international law for the protection of biodiversity.173 
Perhaps the most important policy decision that would allow land 
use management and agricultural practices to play a major role in 
climate change mitigation with co-benefits for health is to what extent 
and in what ways developing countries are included in the post–Kyoto 
mitigation regime.  This is indeed a key debate for determining the 
future of the successor mitigation regime, and was in many ways 
crucial to the downfall of the Kyoto Protocol.  Much of the debate has 
focused on the reluctance of fully industrialized countries like the 
United States174 and those in the European Union175 to commit to 
binding targets unless the rapidly industrializing nations like China 
and India, important emerging competitors, are also bound.  But there 
is another consideration in favor of incorporating developing 
countries, especially those that are rapidly industrializing, into the 
successor mitigation regime.  The great majority of land use 
emissions are in the developing world, and seventy percent of the 
 
171 Id. at 5. 
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174 See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
175 Although the European Union did in fact ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it has not met its 
targets under that agreement.  See BALS, supra note 83.  More recently, the European 
Union has indicated a willingness to make more significant reductions, but only if other 
major competitors do the same.  See id. 
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huge potential for mitigation in the agricultural sector, most of which 
is based on increasing sinks, is in the developing world.176  While 
forest and agricultural emissions and sink reductions account for a 
larger share of GHG concentrations than transportation and industrial 
sectors when considered globally, in industrialized countries they are 
far less significant.  Some global health advocates, based on the 
premise that higher per capita income due to economic development 
is a critical determinant of health,177 may fear that emissions limits 
will hinder development in the poorer countries of the world, and thus 
be harmful to global health.178  However, it is important to understand 
that the mitigation strategies that will be particularly crucial at the 
national level if developing counties are included will have significant 
co-benefits for the health of local populations.179  A massive 
expansion of the CDM might allow for better exploitation of 
mitigation opportunities in the developing world without binding 
developing countries to their own emissions reduction targets, though 
it would not necessarily be enough to induce industrialized countries 
to participate in a protocol that does not bind their rapidly 
industrializing competitors. 
C.  The Importance of Public Health Infrastructure to Adaptation 
Human civilization has always adapted to gradual climate change 
via accommodation or migration, but what is unprecedented is the 
rapidity with which we must now adapt to climate change that is 
greatly accelerated by anthropogenic forcing.180  What is new is “the 
conscious, planned, anticipatory approach” that has been proposed by 
the climate science and advocacy community.181  One of the greatest 
challenges to adaptation planning is that while there is nearly 
universal scientific consensus about the fact that anthropogenically 
forced climate change is occurring, and that it will have significant 
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impacts, the rate and degree of change and the severity of impacts is 
still subject to a great deal of uncertainty, particularly at the local 
level.  The attempt to premeditate adaptation strategies, and thus 
enhance our preparedness for the impacts of climate change, touches 
on technological and policy advances addressing everything from 
retreat of physical infrastructure projects away from coastlines and 
building of structures to withstand more extreme weather events to 
developing agricultural technologies that can sustain food production 
in the face of harsher environmental conditions.  In the health sector, 
adaptation to climate change is expected to require a variety of 
changes to health systems.  Both health care delivery systems and 
public health infrastructure will come into play.  Adaptation to 
climate change is anticipated to require increased capacity to provide 
access to adequate and affordable health care as well as capacity for 
early warning systems, disease monitoring and surveillance, natural 
disaster and public health emergency preparedness and response, and 
public education interventions.182  Additionally, provision for basic 
survival needs, especially water and food systems management, will 
be crucial to our capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change.  
Particularly in the developing world, public health infrastructure and 
national health law have a long way to go to rise to the challenges that 
climate change is likely to pose. 
In addition to creating novel threats to health and shifting the 
geographic scope of existing threats, climate change will also act as 
an intensifier, dramatically increasing the magnitude of preexisting 
problems ranging from poverty, conflict, and hunger to infectious and 
chronic disease burdens.183  Some health adaptation measures will 
likely be aimed at confronting new risks posed by climate change, at 
least at the local level, such as preparation for monitoring and control 
of malaria-carrying mosquitoes at higher altitudes where populations 
have not previously been exposed, or response to new diseases that 
might emerge in the context of changed environmental conditions.  
Most adaptations in the context of global health, however, are likely 
to be “no-regrets strategies.”184  Improvements of public health 
systems focusing on accessible basic health care facilities, clean water 
and sanitation, and disease control programs may be motivated in part 
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by climate change concerns, but are likely to have significant benefits 
regardless of whether climate, in fact, has the impact that scientists 
anticipate.  These strategies have the potential to enhance the ability 
of public health systems to respond to the routine threats they already 
face, even as those threats intensify. 
The public health and global health communities have a long 
history of managing new threats to population well-being.  In many 
ways, the health advocacy community is more experienced with the 
type of questions presented by climate change adaptation than the 
environmental advocacy community.  Whereas international 
environmental governance has typically been concerned with regimes 
that limit the actions of state, and consequently industrial players, 
global health governance has been more focused on promotion of 
health and well-being through affirmative duties.  Adaptation 
necessarily builds more on the latter sort of inquiry, and thus is in 
some ways far afield of the typical focus on environmental regulatory 
bodies.  Health advocates bring their experience in evaluating the 
success and investigating the failure of various types of intervention, 
as well as what they have learned through their experiments with a 
variety of positive law and policy tools. 
Although health advocates have been regrettably late to the climate 
governance table, global health voices are increasingly speaking of 
climate change as one of the most important threats to worldwide 
human well-being.  In a recent resolution, the World Health Assembly 
committed to providing member states with support and advice 
regarding health impacts of climate change and adaptation approaches 
independently of the UNFCCC, and also to seeking a greater role 
within the UNFCCC.185  The UNFCCC Secretariat has been criticized 
for not adequately “supporting processes outside of the Convention 
which have particular expertise in areas that are key to adaptation.”186  
One issue among many under consideration by the UNFCCC Ad-hoc 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and 
the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) is whether a permanent 
adaptation body or expert group should be established under the 
UNFCCC.187  An adaptation body or panel would create a procedural 
 
185 Sixty-First World Health Assembly, supra note 11. 
186 HARMELING, supra note 106, at 6. 
187 Id. at 42–44.  Developing countries largely support the establishment of an 
adaptation body, urging that it would allow for better integration of expertise specific to 
the varied areas touched on by adaptation policy.  Id.  Several industrialized countries have  
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opportunity for health experts, among others, to play a more active 
role in climate adaptation governance. 
Another issue under debate in the UNFCCC AWG-LCA that has 
implications for global health policy is whether adaptation assistance 
from wealthy to developing countries should be mainstreamed with 
Official Development Assistance (ODA).  Developed nations have 
increasingly called for the integration of adaptation into general 
development policy and planning as a precondition for funding.188  
Integration of policy is not particularly controversial, and most agree 
that it is in fact crucial to the development of coherent adaptation 
strategies at the national level. 
Adaptation is not simply a matter of designing projects or putting 
together lists of measures to reduce the impacts of climate change.  
A national policy response would increase resilience to climate 
vulnerability and change and should be anchored in a country’s 
framework for economic growth and sustainable development and 
integrated in its poverty reduction strategies.189 
The controversy arises because developing nations have perceived 
this call for mainstreaming as an indication that developed countries 
will shirk their responsibility for compensating developing countries 
for the impacts of anthropogenically forced climate change.  The 
majority of developed countries have indeed argued that “[b]ecause 
the costs of adaptation . . . provide largely local benefits, [are] 
difficult to distinguish from ‘regular’ development, [are] suspected to 
be large, and smacked of compensation awarded for damages,”190 
substantial funding should not be allocated for adaptation.  Instead, 
they suggested that ODA will play an important role in financing 
adaptation measures.  Given that most countries already fall far short 
of meeting their ODA commitments,191 developing countries insist 
that “adaptation is not funded as general [ODA], but as a kind of 
 
expressed opposition to the idea, noting that there are ways to make use of existing bodies 
outside of the UNFCCC rather than taking on the expense of creating a new adaptation 
body.  Id. 
188 Id. at 21–22. 
189 El-Ashry, supra note 134, at 3–4. 
190 Id. at 4. 
191 See, e.g., ONE, THE DATA REPORT 2009: MONITORING THE G8 PROMISE TO 
AFRICA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, available at http://www.one.org/international/ 
datareport2009/downloads.html. 
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compensation for extra costs that are imposed on them by those who 
contribute the most to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.”192 
The debate highlights that what may seem on the surface to be a 
win-win or no regrets situation, where funds invested for climate 
change adaptation also have multiple co-benefits and are thus more 
cost effective, may belie an attempt to shift funds from ODA to 
climate change adaptation without actually increasing assistance 
overall.  Fundamental principles of international environmental law 
support adaptation-only funding as opposed to ODA mainstreaming.  
Both the “polluter pays” principle established in the Rio 
Declaration193 and the “common but differentiated responsibility” 
principle, which forms the legal foundation of the UNFCCC,194 
support exactly the compensatory character of adaptation funding to 
which developed countries have objected.  Furthermore, given that 
ODA already falls far short of what is needed in the developing 
world, the innovative financing structure of the Adaptation Fund is a 
promising development.195  Global health advocates should promote 
the integration of climate adaptation considerations into development 
plans, but should also advocate strongly for building upon the 
Adaptation Fund’s financing mechanism to allow for significantly 
higher funding, rather than mainstreaming of adaptation funding into 
ODA. 
“Public health prevention and climate change adaptation share the 
goal of increasing the ability of nations, communities, and individuals 
to effectively and efficiently cope with challenges and changes.  
 
192 HARMELING, supra note 106, at 22. 
193 U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
(Aug. 12, 1992) (“National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach 
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution . . . .”).  See also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
54 (2007) (describing GHG pollution as a kind of tort, where polluters who have gained 
economically from their pollution ought to pay for the damage they have caused). 
194 UNFCCC, supra note 70, at art. 3 (“The [p]arties should protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and 
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.  Accordingly, the developed country [p]arties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”). 
195 Cf. Anthony Clunies-Ross, Development Finance: Beyond Budgetary “Official 
Development Assistance,” 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 389, 393 (2004) (stating that financing 
approaches that go beyond official development assistance, including internationally 
coordinated levies, are necessary to provide sufficient funding for development). 
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Indeed, that is what is meant by adaptation to an external stress.”196  
Emphasis on climate change as a fundamental transformation of our 
environment with important consequences for health has the potential 
to motivate the additional political will needed to improve global 
health infrastructure in ways that will make health systems more 
resilient in the face of climate change while also building capacity to 
handle more routine needs.  Many potential climate change adaptation 
projects, such as the development of better disease surveillance and 
response capacity, improvements in sanitation and protection of food 
and water security, and the strengthening of natural disaster 
preparedness and response capabilities, look a lot like traditional 
international health initiatives. 
Rights and responsibilities with respect to adaptation, currently 
being negotiated under the auspices of the UNFCCC, have the 
potential to create new opportunities to focus on the basic survival 
needs of the world’s least healthy people197 in ways that previous 
efforts at international cooperation with respect to health have not.  
This is due to a basic difference between the motivation for traditional 
means of international cooperation with respect to health and the 
motivation driving cooperation on adaptation.  The recently revised 
International Health Regulations, for example, establish obligations 
for international cooperation that are largely driven by the threat of 
transboundary spread of disease.198  Some critics have suggested that 
the history of these regulations indicates that they are ultimately 
motivated by the threat of spread from the developing world to the 
industrialized world.199  Focus on self-interest as a motivation for 
wealthy countries’ willingness to cooperate on global health 
 
196 Gary Yohe & Kristie L. Ebi, Approaching Adaptation: Parallels and Contrasts 
Between the Climate and Health Communities, in INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH WITH 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra 
note 97, at 18, 18. 
197 Cf. SVEN HARMELING ET AL., MAKING THE ADAPTATION FUND WORK FOR THE 
MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE (2008) available at http://www.germanwatch.org/ 
klima/adfund08.pdf. 
198 See David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health 
Security: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 325, 336 
(2005). 
199 See id.; see also Oyewale Tomori, Presentation prepared for the Forum on Microbial 
Threats Public Workshop: IHR and Movement of Pathogens in a Globalized World (Dec. 
16–17, 2008), http://veterans.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/ 
MicrobialThreats/Tomori.ashx (addressing perception of the motivation behind the IHR as 
an obstacle to implementation in developing countries). 
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initiatives necessarily plays a role in dictating the priorities that will 
be addressed by that cooperation.  This emphasis leads, for example, 
to prioritization of emerging diseases that have the potential for rapid 
spread over reducing more burdensome impacts from relatively easily 
addressed threats such as parasitic or diarrheal illness.200  The health 
impacts of climate change are, for the most part, not the sort of threats 
that are likely to move rapidly from the developing world to the 
industrialized world.  It is certainly possible that changed climate 
conditions could foster the emergence of new viruses with the 
potential for global spread.  It is more likely, however, that most 
threats, including the intensification of diarrheal illness, the gradual 
latitudinal and altitudinal spread of vector-borne illness, greater 
intensity of natural disasters, and the effects of insecurity and water 
stress more generally, will not be of the sort that prompt self-
interested action by wealthy countries to build improved health 
infrastructure in the developing world.  The adaptation regime 
currently under negotiation, however, is not prompted by the 
transboundary nature of the impacts of climate change as much as it is 
by the transboundary nature of the causes.  This might mean that 
adaptation cooperation faces an uphill battle.  But, if it is successful, 
both the tie between adaptation cooperation for the benefit of 
developing countries and the willingness of developing countries to 
participate in a mitigation regime might be the crucial key to that 
success, then it will allow for international cooperation on health 
threats that have previously been neglected. 
IV 
MOVING THE DEBATE FORWARD 
As the focus of the UNFCCC has broadened to include greater 
consideration of adaptation to the impacts of climate change, 
communities beyond the traditional boundaries of environmental 
regulatory policymaking have begun to realize the extent to which 
their interests are implicated by the international response to climate 
change.  Indeed, adaptation requires a very different set of law, 
policy, and governance tools than environmental policymakers have 
 
200 See, e.g., Peter J. Hotez et al., Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1018, 1018–19 (2007) (comparing the impacts of neglected tropical diseases, 
most of which are preventable through environmental health interventions such as clean 
water and sanitation, with those of emerging acute infections such as Ebola virus and avian 
influenza). 
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traditionally employed in their mitigation efforts,201 and it may be that 
policymakers from other sectors, including global health, are better 
suited to the effort.  In recent years, the UNFCCC has shown a greater 
willingness to reach out to the health, agricultural, and land use 
sectors for expertise and policymaking guidance on mitigation policy 
as well as adaptation.  The challenges posed by such an all-
encompassing scope for international cooperation are indeed 
considerable, but so are the opportunities.  Consideration of the co-
benefits of particular mitigation opportunities, for health as well as for 
sustainable development more generally, should play a crucial role in 
weighing the various policy options currently under consideration.  
By prompting a recalculation of the costs and benefits, bringing these 
broader considerations into account may serve to move the debate 
forward in a way that increases the likelihood that the international 
community will take meaningful action on climate change as the 
international community continues to negotiate and implement a 
post–2012 climate agreement 
 
201 Cf. Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood, Environmental Law for Sustainability, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 1, 2 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan 
Wood eds., 2006) (discussing the command and control approach traditionally applied to 
environmental problems). 
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